Torture and Prisons in Turkey

December 6, 1996

[We thank Miranda Watson, a UK-based human rights activist for translating this report of members of the Turkish parliament into English. To those of you who speak Turkish, we urge you to contact our office, the American Kurdish Information Network, to get a copy of the report in its original Turkish text and 16 page format. It reads as a sad commentary on the state of our humanity. We ask that you distribute this English version or the Turkish one as widely as possible with the hopes that this practice of torturing and killing the captured will come to an end. As always, we thank you for your interest in the Kurds.]

Report based on investigation of four Turkish MPs into the massacre of 10 Kurdish political detainees on September 24, 1996 at Diyarbakir Prison; additional material from The Association for the Prevention of Torture (APT), Turkey File No. 3 Torture and Prisons: from Bad to Worse. Geneva, July 1996; and documentation of Istanbul Section President of the Human Rights Association of Turkey (IHD) advocate Ercan Kanar, April 1996; IHD Bulletins No.77-82; and the Turkish press.

A confrontation between 33 prisoners and guards in Diyarbakir E-Type Closed Prison C-Block on September 24, 1996 resulted in the deaths of 10 remand prisoners and the wounding of 23, nine very seriously, in what a prisoner- witness described as a "planned massacre" involving dozens of prison, police and army personnel in full riot gear, armed with batons.

Four MPs from the ad-hoc Turkish Parliamentary Human Rights Sub- Commission, meeting on August 10, 1996, decided to investigate. Eskisehir MP Demir Berberoglu (Chair), Hakan Tartan MP for Izmir (Spokesperson), Izmir MP Sabri Gul (Secretary) and Batman MP Musa Okcu (Member) subsequently visited the prison to interview those involved.

Although the security forces who had taken command of the operation were unavailable for questioning, the delegation was able to obtain a very clear picture both of the incident itself and the ongoing repressive conditions inflicted on the huge numbers of Kurds held in Turkish jails: the vast majority of whom are held on remand, for often long periods, in overcrowded and filthy conditions. Basic rights are ignored: violence, including torture, is frequent; detainees are routinely beaten during transfers and forced to become informants; interventions from external security forces are tolerated; and doctors are often pressurised to falsify medical reports.

Background

In the State of Emergency region of SE Turkey or NW Kurdistan in particular, the rule of law has collapsed so completely that the Strasbourg Court of Human Rights no longer requires individuals bringing cases against Turkey to first exhaust all domestic legal remedies. Whilst Turkey's judiciary remains so manifestly unjust and the state continues to ignore the urgency of a political solution to the Kurdish issue, it is hardly surprising that much of its prison population is made up of literally thousands of Kurdish and Turkish Prisoners of Conscience and/or Prisoners of War (POWs). The treatment of these prisoners is a crime against humanity.

The massacre in Diyarbakir Prison came only months after the hunger- strikes of around 10,000 political prisoners in 40 Turkish jails, calling for a series of basic legal and human rights reforms including recognized PoW status. When the death toll started to rise daily, international concern for the hungerstrikers finally forced Turkey into negotiations with the prisoners. Despite this, and waves of other prison protests and hunger-strikes over recent years demanding the establishment of a penal system that corresponded to acceptable minimum standards and an end to the violence and repression, there have been no tangible reforms, as this report testifies. As the Association for the Prevention of Torture (APT) pointed out in July 1996: "The authorities sometimes pretend to give in. However subsequently, they often double their severity, not to say brutality." The APT also noted:

".... numerous signs of a political hardening toward demands by detainees and, in a more general manner, toward the Turkish authorities' obligation to respect human rights and ensure that they be respected by others.... Respect for human rights is far from assured in three areas: First torture continues to be practiced on a large scale during arrest and custody by the police; second, the situation in Turkish prisons has continued to be alarming since several years; third, persons and groups/ organizations committed to the defense of human rights in Turkey have become more and more a direct target of various pressures and intimidation."

Built in 1980, Diyarbakir Prison was placed under military jurisdiction in September 1980 and not returned to the Ministry of Justice until May 1988. The delegation found the prison was, in general, unsanitary and over- crowded: in one upstairs corridor drainage pipes had burst, seeping sewage all over the floor, and containers of food were seen at the entrances of corridors. The APT observed that the situation in jails is now "chronic" and that "certain prisoners' rights (access to care, healthy food, visits, utilisation of cultural and sports facilities, etc.) are being used against them as a means of pressure..."

The delegation was concerned that fascist flags, posters and graffiti which they saw on the walls of the informers' block seemed to be allowed by the authorities; and the APT report observed that "The running of prisons is entrusted more and more to persons of ultra-nationalist tendency, known for their violence."

The APT reported that "given the increasing number of political detainees... the Ministry of Justice is demanding the creation of 62 new DGMs (state security courts) daily." According to official figures for 1995, 8,751 detainees out of a total 49,705 were political. In Diyarbakir the ratio was much higher. Although its capacity is officially 650, the delegation found 942 prisoners there, of which only 85 were convicted and 857 were still on remand. A staggering 407 of remand detainees were PKK political prisoners.

September 24, 1996: Early warning of incident?

The first prisoner-informer to speak to the delegation (referred to here as "1st Informer") said that on September 24, 1996 he heard the prisoner organization based in Ward 35 alerting other prisoners to prepare to move from passive to active resistance. Presumably this informer was part of the ³intelligence corps² referred to by First Governor Mahmut Caca, who gave precisely same information to the delegation. Meanwhile Second Governor Aziz Gurer noticed uneasiness between two groups of prisoners in the bathroom area.

10.30 hrs: Initial confrontation

31 remand prisoners arrived in C-Block from Wards 18 and 19 on their way to see their visitors and as usual opened the doors to ask officers for containers to collect any food and other items supplied by their visitors. This was standard practice and their request would normally have been dealt with easily. When prison guards unexpectedly refused, a fight broke out, Head Prison Officer Fethi Ahmet Onat was called in and the gates shut.

First Governor Mahmut Caca said that on their way to the visitors' area, the 31 prisoners had been opening cell doors and chatting to other prisoners, which was not allowed. He said that when guards tried to stop this the prisoners began to manhandle them and the guards had to run away. When prison guard Tahsin Erkul warned the prisoners he was hit in the face. Another prisoner-informer ("2nd Informer" quoted here) saw prisoner Iskan Uysal push a guard and prisoner Remzi Tanrikulu swear at and punch Onat through the bars, which Onat confirms.

Bayram Altin and a fellow C-Block prisoner-witness (who understandably wished to remain anonymous) had a different version of events. They testified to the prisonersı surprise at the unreasonable and abusive behaviour of the officers. Some of the prisoners tried to ease the tension and calm everyone down but their request to return quietly to their cells was refused. Altin heard Onat swearing at the prisoners, then saw him leave with other officers, threatening to teach the prisoners a lesson.

Reinforcements of prison officers and two army military officers were brought in and Second Governor Aziz Gurer informed Caca that prisoners had attacked prison officers. If the prisoners had indeed tussled with or even hit prison officers, this would hardly have justified the massacre to follow several hours later. Though three guards went to hospital, none were badly hurt and Onatıs minor injuries were dealt with in a matter of minutes.

10.30-15.30 hrs: Waiting period

The 31 prisoners were kept in C-Block area for 5-6 hours, until 15.30 hrs or 16.00 hrs (reports differ), when the security forces launched the operation. They were joined at some point by three other prisoners returning to their cell block from the medical centre. Meanwhile one prisoner indicated he wished to turn informer (the "2nd Informer"). He was removed and taken upstairs where he could still hear the prisoners shouting: "Down with torture!" This left a total of 33 prisoners behind the locked gates.

Even at this stage the situation could perhaps have been defused without loss of life. The period of waiting could have been an opportunity for cooling off, but instead the crisis deepened. Caca gave an unconfirmed report that the prisoners made a fire to let the other prisoners and the outside world know what was happening, at which point he called in Chief Prosecutor Mehmet Tiftikci. Tiftikci arrived from the courts around noon and reported that he found that necessary security arrangements had been taken: that the soldiers and police were not carrying metal bars (as the C-Block prisoner- witness stated) and had put down their guns and rifles before entering the prison.

Tiftikci apparently told the prisoners to stop and return to their cells but the prisoners refused to allow their so-called ringleaders (named by the officers who had run away) to give themselves up. The situation was then reported to the Ministry of Justice and the request was made to transfer some of the prisoners to Gaziantep Special Prison.

Police and army called in

Were other prisoners meanwhile breaking open gates, as the authorities allege? Caca reported that prisoners in their wards had started to pass pipes and metal taken from their beds to prisoners outside who used these to open the gates. He said that when these prisoners went to D-Block and tried to break down other doors, the authorities then asked for help from the prison army unit and the police, who arrived at 13.15 hrs to discuss with the prison authorities how to contain the situation. By 15.20 hrs Caca had obtained permission to take action against the prisoners.

Prisoner-witness Altin denied that prisoners had broken down any gates, noting that as the incident was going on the electricity serving all the blocks was cut off. They could have tried to get the 33 prisoners out but did not. In any case, as the gates were automatic, they could be lifted anyway once the electricity went off so there would have been no need for the prisoners to break them. Nevertheless, the next day the guards came and welded the gates together. Altin believed that in doing this the authorities wanted to give the impression that the gates had been broken by the prisoners.

15.30-6.00 hrs: Attack commenced

Between 15.30-16.00 hrs the gates were opened and the attack commenced. Reports differ as to the exact times and duration of the operation. The timing is crucial. Tiftikci said the incident lasted more than half an hour and Head Prison Officer Onat said that altogether it took about an hour to contain the situation and to take away the injured prisoners. As Dr. Selcuk Mizrak (Diyarbakir Medical Association) received news at 16.00 hrs that 30 wounded prisoners were being sent to Diyarbakir Hospital, it is likely that the entire incident lasted from 15.30 to 16.30 hrs as First Governor Caca states.

All officials and prisoner-witnesses interviewed agree on certain facts: that the soldiers and police converged from two directions, wearing full riot gear and armed with batons or truncheons.

First Governor Caca denied prisoner reports that Special Team police forces had come into the prison to assist but confirmed he had 30 officers with him after the riot started and 30 riot police and 25 soldiers were involved. The delegation accepts this figure but counted 36 police officers and 153 soldiers were involved altogether (including army and police chiefs). The C-Block prisoner-witness confirms that not all of the few hundred police and soldiers in the prison took part in the attack (some of whom wore beards).

Public Prosecutor Ibrahim Akbas said that prison instructions state that as a first resort tear gas is to be used to contain such incidents, after which prisoners may be dispersed using rifle butts. Why then were truncheons immediately used on these prisoners? Why had Caca not deployed his staff of 275 prison officers (working in four shifts) or deployed water or tear gas to stop the incident and ensure no loss of life?

In reply, Caca explained that the prison officers did not have the equipment to deal with the incident and that, once the security forces had taken over, the prison staff no longer had authority. He said that the Deputy Battalion Commander, the Unit Commander and the Police Inspector had been in charge of the operation. Tiftikci confirms that the Deputy Battalion Commander had been in charge. Why then were the security forces and these particular officers not available for questioning by the MPs? The delegation recommended that there needs to be agreement as to who takes authority when such incidents occur. One could add that those responsible should also be held accountable.

Second Governor Aziz Gurer said the prison authorities had given a final warning before taking action. Head Prosecutor Tiftikci said that the police came from the front area and the soldiers from the kitchen area. He saw the police advance and prisoners with metal bars resisting but he also admitted that he was behind the police and so unable to see the prisoners properly. The 1st Informer (at the gates during the disturbance) said that any prisoners holding radiator pipes or bars from their bunk beds dropped them when the attack commenced. He added that talk inside and outside the prison agreed that what had happened was wrong.

Prisoner-witness Altin saw police and soldiers appear from the kitchen side and Special Police arrive from the other direction shouting "Allah! Allah!" slogans. They charged the prisoners, attacking them and hitting them on their heads. He said that the prisoners had only tried to defend themselves: they bore no grudge against the informers, who had had nothing to do with what happened. He said that the situation could have been contained but the way it was dealt with was like a planned massacre.

The C-Block prisoner-witness confirms this. He saw soldiers and Special Police with wood and steel bars in their hands appear from the visitorsı area. When the gates were opened, soldiers and riot police started to attack the prisoners- even those who were trying to hide in corners. He saw one prisoner being hit on the head, become disorientated, turn, fall to the floor and stop moving.

Tiftikci said that as one police unit entered, another unit prepared to back them up. He ordered another unit of soldiers from a group of 22 to leave their rifles and be ready to back up the others. While this was going on, the police removed one prisoner (the 2nd Informer?) On going downstairs Tiftikci saw Deputy Police Chief Hasan Senay and a group of police officers, gendarmes and the fire engine. Doctors and personnel were standing by. Tiftikci warned the hospital (at 16.00 hrs?) that there could be wounded. All the necessary tasks were then completed- such as checking the prisoners, regaining discipline and signing the prisonersı transfer documents. Documents required for putting the security forces on trial, if necessary, were sent to the Governor of Diyarbakir.

16.30 hrs: Prisoners examined by doctors

Onat and Tiftikci reported that the wounded prisoners were taken to the visitors' cabin where the doctors examined them. Prisoner-witness Altin said that after the attack the authorities had dragged the injured prisoners to the visitors' area and dumped them one on top of each other, where they were left for an hour before being taken to the hospital.

It is certainly possible that the prisoners had incurred their serious and fatal injuries very early on in the attack. Caca and the prison doctors agree that the prisoner casualties were not assessed until 16.30 hrs (an hour after the attack began) and emergency medical treatment for the gravely injured and dying prisoners was not everyone's priority: Tiftikci reported that one of the army officers thought the wounded soldiers should be treated before the prisoners but was told to take these soldiers to the military hospital.

In the light of poor medical provision in the Turkey's other 650 prisons, any treatment whatsoever given to the Diyarbakir prisoners could certainly be seen by some officers as a rare luxury. According to Ministry of Justice data for 1995, "Only 124 prisons possess an infirmary, and on average one physician per prison is assigned to it on a limited basis. There is neither an emergency nor a duty doctor. Sometimes detainees must wait for several days for transfer to hospital." [APT]

Prison doctors Mehmet Veysi Fidantekin and Serdar Gok were in the prison medical centre for the duration of the incident, where they said they received and treated the wounded as they were brought in. Which wounded? The doctors were not called to attend the prisoners in the visitors' area until 16.30 hrs and it was there they found about 30 injured prisoners covered in blood. Dr. Fidantekin reported that on his way to the incident he had hoped that with luck all the prisoners would be alright and could be transferred to Gaziantep Prison, but on reaching the scene he realised that the prisonersı condition was extremely serious. He commented that when a similar incident had occurred in 1994 (a revolt involving 300 prisoners) nothing like this had happened.

As there was no space in the visitors' area to enable the prison doctors to deal with the injured, they were taken to the control room. The doctors saw two prisoners whose heads had been broken open. Five or six others had puffed eyes and crushed skulls, and were bleeding from the head and ears. They felt that these five or six would not survive their injuries. 19 seriously injured and urgent cases were transferred to Diyarbakir Hospital and those who seemed alright- who had no injuries "likely to cause problems" and who were able to walk- were transferred to Gaziantep Prison. Onat said he checked the wounded prisoners' IDs before arranging their transfers.

The delegation noted that during the prison doctors' examinations the prison authorities asked prisoners to become informers. Two had agreed. These two were later sent with the 17 others to Diyarbakir Hospital. Prison doctors Fidantekin and Gok confirm that after the incident two prisoners were kept in a separate room, both saying they no longer wanted to belong to the PKK; that they wanted nothing to do with either side but were willing to become informers. One of these told the doctors that he was not there to cause or get involved in the problems; he was only there to see his visitors and his loved ones. The doctor tried to help him psychologically. Tiftikci said that the authorities had put no pressure on the doctors and the doctors said that the prison authorities had encouraged- but not forced- any prisoners to become informers. The story told by the prisoners transferred to Gaziantep was very different.

16.40 hrs: 19 prisoners transferred to Diyarbakir Hospital

It seems very unlikely that the prisoners could have been seen by the prison doctors at 16.30 hrs, lugged from visitor's centre to the control room to be medically examined, loaded onto prison vehicles and delivered to Diyarbakir Hospital, all in the space of just ten minutes, when injuries were so serious and the journey alone on empty roads would take this time. Yet the statement of Dr. Selcuk Mizrak, the first doctor at the hospital to deal with the casualties, suggests this. He said that three prison vehicles initially brought the prisoners to the prison ward at around 16.40 hrs and when this area was found to be too small to contain them all, the Prosecutor granted permission for them to be taken to the general hospital.

Were seven prisoners killed during the attack in the prison or did they die in transit to the hospital? Both prison doctors, Prosecutor Tiftikci and Second Governor Gurer (given the task of accounting for the prisoners) all assert that no prisoners were dead on leaving the prison, yet Dr. Mizrak's testimony suggests otherwise.

On opening the doors of one vehicle, Mizrak saw six to seven bodies piled on top of each other. Checking more closely he noted that all had head wounds and two had already died. The rest were taken to the emergency unit and seven were registered dead in the hospital records. Only 20 minutes later (17.00 hrs) Tiftikci was already meeting with the Governor of the State of Emergency region to discuss their burial.

Of the 19 prisoners sent to Diyarbakir State Hospital, a total of nine died: seven were found dead on arrival (Erkan Hakan Perisan, Cemal Cam, Hakki Tekin, Ahmet Celik, Edib Direkci, Mehmet Nimet Cakmak, Ridvan Bulut) and two others died in hospital (Mehmet Kadri Gumus, Mehmet Aslan). Of seven others who were seriously wounded, one was saved by an operation and all needed to be admitted to the intensive care unit (Ramazan Korkar, Iskan Ozal, Mehmet Batuge, Mehmet Emin Izra, Ramazan Nazlier, Yasin Alevcan, Abdullah Eflatun). The last three were treated for wounds (Kenan Acar, Hakki Bozkus, Bedri Bozkus).

Dr. Mizrak admitted that whilst he was not a pathologist, he was a surgeon with a great deal of experience of such incidents. In his experience, it was normal in such circumstances to find broken arms and legs but this time the autopsy reports showed hardly any broken limbs- which indicates that the prisoners had been held down and then beaten. The 2nd Informer was taken to the hospital to identify the dead. He reported that none had bullet wounds: all the men had died from blows to their heads.

Dr. Mizrak told the delegation that it had been known in the past for the security forces to put pressure on the doctors to distort their medical reports but that this had not been the case this time. It is difficult to tell how he knew this as the report prepared by doctors of the State Hospital was not shown to him.

Neither Mizrak nor any other doctor had any opportunity to communicate with the wounded prisoners but he heard that the injured soldiers would be sent to the military hospital for treatment. First Governor Mahmut Caca said that altogether 27 soldiers and police officers had been injured- but no one gives any report of serious injury to the security forces and Dr. Mizrak said that the two prison guards who had come in for treatment did not in fact require any. The delegation noted that amongst all the soldiers and police who had taken part in the incident, none had asked for any reports from the medical authorities: the 18 soldiers who did receive medical reports had only minor injuries.

14 prisoners transferred to Gaziantep Prison

Of the 14 prisoners transferred to Gaziantep Special Prison, one died in transit (Kadri Demir), two were taken to intensive care on arrival (Ahmet Sever, Muhlis Altun) and the other 11 needed treatment for wounds in Gaziantep Hospital before transfer to Gaziantep Prison.

Prosecutor Tiftikci admitted that although it should not happen, it was still general practice to beat prisoners during transfers. This practice is confirmed by the IHD Advocate Ercan Kanar. The delegation gave credence to the accusations of the PKK prisoners removed to Gaziantep Prison, who claimed that prison authorities had targeted them to become informers. They said that when they refused, they were deliberately put into a situation where they could be killed. Their accusation is borne out by the facts.

The delegation notes that although these 14 prisoners had apparently been given a clean bill of health for transfers to Gaziantep Prison, they must have been attacked in transit for one to be found dead on arrival and the others to require hospitalization- two in intensive care.

Prisoner-witness Altin also reported that the injured prisoners sent to Gaziantep Special Prison later sent them information: one army officer hitting the prisoners had told them if they did not become informers they would be killed. Two had agreed to inform and one of these pointed out certain other prisoners who were duly taken away, tortured and killed. IHD advocate Ercan Kanar confirms that detainees (sentenced or not) are "compelled to become collaborators" and are "tortured at regular intervals by warders and Special Teams." Even "Turkish leaders have understood that denying the existence of torture is futile." [APT]

The IHD and the Diyarbakir Bar Association both gave the delegation a general assessment of the situation and reported what they had been told by their clients. On meeting the Prosecutor in the Legal Club, the DBA lawyers had asked to see the wounded in prison and in hospital but were refused permission and they were also refused access to the medical reports. One lawyer said that a client of his (on remand for 6 weeks charged under article 169 ) was now dead.

Aftermath

As a result of the incident, Governors Mahmut Caca and Aziz Gurer have been dismissed from their duties and 30 prison personnel, 38 police officers and 30 soldiers involved have allegedly been investigated and reports sent to the Governor of Diyarbakir. Chief Prosecutor Tiftikci forwarded the view that all those involved should be questioned and, if necessary, brought to trial. But though the events of September 24, 1996 had wide repercussions in Turkey and internationally, the delegation believed that in all likelihood there would be a cover-up.

After the massacre the general public was fed a grossly distorted version of events and any official investigations have inevitably been low- key. There have been no follow-up reports of any prosecutions or convictions of the officers involved. The current condition of the surviving 23 prisoners and of those prisoners who bore witness is also not known.

Postscript: Turkish state policy on human rights, hungerstrike and massacre

1. According to the APT, political instability within Turkey is in itself a pretext for violators. Turkish leaders play for time in the face of pressure from outside, especially from Europe, demanding that Turkey adapt its law and practice regarding human rights to international norms and standards, Turkey routinely promises foreign delegations reform with regard the struggle against torture and impunity but the tone within the country is significantly different.

2. "There is no real political will to combat human rights violations and reinforce the democratic process: an accumulation of violent acts has been observed in the course of the last few months on a scale which is not only individual but also collective. This points too strongly in the direction of a systematic repression to be ignore or minimalised."