Again, the Kurds Are at a Crossroad

Dr. Mohammed M. A. Ahmed

03/30/2002

Once again the Kurds of Southern Kurdistan-Iraq have reached a turning point in their winding and trying history, which has been colored by many more downs than ups. They have suffered considerable material losses and emotional pain at the hands of their neighbors and of distant powers. Though they have been unjustly accused in the past of unseemly vices, the Kurds have amicably coexisted with their greedy and aggressive neighbors for many centuries. Their inability to unify their folds has emboldened their neighbors to tighten their grip on them, to depriving them of their cultural heritage. It is difficult for many to understand why the Kurds continue to fall victim to their neighbors and distant powers.

The 1991 Kurdish uprising and its disastrous consequences prompted the United States of America and Great Britain to create a safe-haven zone to entice the fleeing Kurds to return to their homes from the snow-capped Kurdistan mountains. This was done partly to relieve Turkey, a close American ally, from the political repercussions and economic burden of the flow of large numbers of Kurdish refugees from Southern Kurdistan-Iraq to the Kurdish region of Turkey. Since the 1991 Gulf War, the US and Britain have protected the Kurds from Saddam Hussein, partly for humanitarian reason and partly to use the region to contain Saddam Hussein.

The Kurds squandered the golden opportunity of the 1991 Gulf war to plant the seeds of an independent Kurdish state in Southern Kurdistan by leaving the administration of the region to the international community as the Kosovars did. However, the eagerness of the Kurds to assume the administration of their region by themselves relieved the United Nations and its members of their legal responsibility. Being a landlocked territory should not have prevented the Kurds from embarking on the journey towards independence. Numerous small landlocked countries in the world have survived the retribution of their neighbors. Nevertheless, the 1992 democratic elections revived the great hopes and expectations of the Kurds about their future. However, internal rivalries between the two major Kurdish political parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) soon dashed these hopes by dividing the unity government they had formed into two local administrations. After more than six years of on and off negotiations between these two parties, Southern Kurdistan-Iraq remains divided politically and geographically. Their enemies would not have asked the Kurds for more than what they would have done for themselves by maintaining the status quo in the region.

Despite or because of the lack of total harmony in the region, the Kurdish region seems to enjoy more personal freedom and economic prosperity than at any other time in their recent history. This may be indicative of the great economic and political potentials of the Kurdish people. Given required opportunities, the Kurds could make invaluable contributions to the political stability and economic prosperity of the Middle East today as they have done in the past. After all the Kurds are not as bad as their neighbors have claimed them to be.

The trusting nature of the Kurds has exposed them to many atrocities and betrayals in the past. They were betrayed by Saddam in the early 1970s and the United States and Iran in the mid 1970s and again during the 1991 Kurdish uprising. However, since 1991, the Kurds have been reassured by the United States that they will continue to protect them from Saddam`s future military attacks. However, neither the United States nor Great Britain have made any written political commitment to the Kurds regarding their future status. While the present stalemate between Saddam and the west has accorded the Kurds the opportunity to enjoy a degree of individual freedom and economic prosperity, there is no indication that they have any long-term outside political prospect. The allied forces are expected to protect the Kurds of Southern Kurdistan-Iraq as long as the situation serves their national interests. With American support, Turkey continues to resist any change in the political status of the Kurds, claiming that such a change would impinge on its national interests. Without the cooperation of the Kurds, Turkey will not be able to preserve the status quo in the region indefinitely. Their numerical advantage and cultural heritage demand Turkey`s full respect. Turkey should not take for granted the long-term cooperation and good will of the Kurdish people.

For their cooperation with Turkey, Iran, and Syria, Kurdish political parties of Iraq have been rewarded with easy access to the outside world. This has gained the Kurds considerable diplomatic skills and western countries` sympathy for the Kurds. However, the political parties have failed to cash in the dividend of the overwhelming sympathy of the western countries and media during the past decade. For this reason, the west has continued to deal with the Kurdish question as a humanitarian rather than a political issue. While they opened their doors to thousands of Kurdish asylum seekers and refugees in the early 1990s, they are now threatening to send large numbers of Kurds back to Southern Kurdistan. For some reason, some of the brightest and wealthiest Kurds continue to flee the safe haven zone. The political parties have the responsibility to explain to their constituents why these Kurds are fleeing the region, which is supposed to enjoy considerable individual freedom and economic prosperity. Would this be the result of uncertainties about American and British commitments to their future well being?

The United States` containment policy of Saddam Hussein through political pressure and economic embargo seems to have failed to rid him of his weapons of mass destruction. Saddam has out-maneuvered the United States in every step it has taken to disarm him. The Iraqi National Congress (INC) and Kurdish political parties were used to pressurize Saddam to yield to the US demands for the return of the United Nations weapon inspectors to wrap up their work of eliminating the residuals of weapons of mass destruction from Iraq. Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the twin towers in New York and on the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., the Bush administration has pursued a more aggressive polity of threatening Saddam Hussein with a military coup unless he allows the return of the UN inspectors to Iraq.

Continued discussions by American political and military strategists have convinced the State Department that unless Saddam Hussein is replaced with another Iraqi leader, tranquillity will not prevail in the Middle East. It has become clear to the US that the only people who could help overthrow Saddam are the high-ranking Iraqi military defectors to the west. In reality, the US might forgo such an action if Saddam accepts the return of the UN inspectors of weapons of mass destruction. No one can guarantee that other Iraqi military leaders will behave better than Saddam.

On March 25,2002, the Newsweek magazine reported that General Nizar Al-Khazraji, Lt. General Mahdi Al- Deleimi, Brigadier General Najib Al-Salhi, and General Fawzi Al-Shmari are some of the possible candidates who have been identified to lead a military coup against Saddam. At present Al-Khazraji is under investigation in Denmark for the chemical attack on Halabja in 1988. The other generals might have played substantive roles in attacks on the Kurds during the Anfal campagin in 1988. Instead of placing these personalities on trial for crimes against humanity, the US national interest seem to dictate using them as change agents in Iraq.

In his analytical piece of March 20, 2002, Ghassan al-Attiyya states that the change in the American approach from containment to overthrowing Saddam means that the roles of the Kurds and the Iraqi National Congress (INC) in the struggle will be marginalized. According to al-Atiyya, INC "is no longer acceptable in its present 'Shiite-Kurdish' guise". By pursuing this policy, the US will curtail the role of the Shiites, and by association, Iran, which it considers to be part of the evil axis, and it eliminates the role of the Kurds in order to appease its close ally, Turkey. Does this mean the Kurds will be abandoned again by the west, especially after their close cooperation with Turkey in fighting the members of the Kurdistan Workers Party?

After all those atrocities committed against the Kurds during, before, and after the 1988 Anfal campaign by different governments in Baghdad, what kind of future would they expect under another pan-Arabist military ruler? Have the Kurds forgotten the roles of King Faisal and his son against them, or for that matter of those of Abdul Karim Qasim, or Abdul Salam and Abdul Rahman Arif , or Ahmad Hassan al-Bakir or Saddam Hussein? Do the Kurdish leaders have any written agreement with any of the defected Iraqi army generals and their political organizations on the concept of a federal government or the future status of the safe haven zone? Would the new Arab government in Baghdad agree to the return of the Kurds expelled from their homes as a result of ethnic cleansing and would they compensate them for losses they have suffered? Would the new government recognize the historic boundaries of southern Kurdistan-Iraq?

Hopefully, Daneil Goure of the Lexington Institute in Arlington, Virginia, is correct that "It`s entirely possible that it might take two years before you (US) are ready to go after the Iraqis." This should give the Kurds more breathing room to consolidate their political gains in the safe haven zone. Continuation of the status quo in the safe haven zone may depend on the survival of Saddam. The Kurds should also try to build their political fortune on recent US initiatives to indict Saddam Hussein and his cronies for crimes committed in the Kurdish region against humanity. The fear of the return of Saddam or his like may justify a call by the Kurds for permanent international protection from future oppression.

The Kurds of Iraq have closely cooperated with and often assisted the neighboring states to improve the security and stability of the region at the expense of antagonizing their Kurdish brethren. What kind of reward should the Kurds expect from these states for their neighborly gestures? Would these states help the Iraqi Kurds by pressurizing Baghdad to positively respond to their demands? Have the Kurdish political parties been assured of some kind of support and political recognition after the United States had resolved its conflict with Iraq? Failing to secure internal Arab or external political support to settle the Kurdish question amicably, do the Kurds have any plan to prevent another tragic exodus from the Kurdish region when Saddam or one of his proteges return to the Kurdish region? It would be quite comforting for the Kurds if the Kurdish political parties in Iraq could address some of these and other related questions which have been cited above.