Noam
Chomsky Addressing the Kurds in Amed
March
31, 2002
If I can open with just a personal
remark of my own, it is a very moving experience for me to be here. I have
followed as best I can the noble and tragic history of the Kurds in Turkey in
past years from everything I can find, particularly in last ten years. But it
is quite different to see the actual faces of the people who are resisting and
who continue to struggle for freedom and justice.
I have been asked repeatedly to
express my opinion about the rights of people to use their mother tongue. As a
linguist I have no opinion about the matter. As a human being there is nothing
to discuss. It is too obvious. The right to use one’s mother tongue
freely in every way that one wants -- in literature, in public meetings, in any
other form -- that is a primary essential human right. There is nothing further
to say about it.
The campaign of the past weeks of
the students, mothers, fathers to petition for the right to have elective
courses in one’s own language is again simply affirming an elementary
human right that should not even be under discussion. One can only admire the
courage of people who are pressing this campaign in the face of repression and
adversity.
Beyond the matter of cultural
rights, which are beyond discussion, obvious rights, there lies the world of
difficult, intricate questions of political rights. These issues are arising
all over the world.
One of the healthy developments now
taking place in Europe is the erosion of the nation-state system with
increasing regionalization. In areas from Catalonia to Scotland, there is a
revival of traditional languages, cultures, customs and a degree of political
autonomy leading towards what may become -- and I think should become -- an
arrangement of regional areas that are essentially autonomous within a federal
framework. In fact something like the old Ottoman empire. There was a lot wrong
with the Ottoman empire, but some things about it were basically correct:
mainly, the fact that it left a high degree of regional autonomy and
independence within a framework, which unfortunately was autocratic and corrupt
and brutal, but we can eliminate that part, and the positive aspects of the
Ottoman empire probably ought to be reconstructed in some fashion.
And within that kind of framework,
which I hope will be evolving, one can, I think, look forward to an autonomous
Kurdistan, which can bring together the Kurds of the region, the tens of
millions of Kurds of the region, into a self-governing, autonomous, culturally
independent, politically active region, as part of a broader federation of --
one hopes - friendly and cooperating national and ethnic and cultural groups.
The next question that arises has
to do with the methods of struggle to achieve such ends. Here the primary
question is whether these methods should be violent or non-violent. Here we
have to distinguish two kinds of questions: moral questions and tactical
questions. With regard to the moral questions, my own personal view is that a
very heavy burden of proof is required for anyone who advocates or undertakes
the use of violence. In my view that burden of proof can very rarely be met.
Non-violent protest is more appropriate morally, and tactically as well.
However, there is a fundamental principle of non-violence: "you do not
preach non-violence unless you are willing to stand alongside to the people who
are suffering the repression." Otherwise, you can’t give that
advice. I’m not in a position to stand next to the people who are
suffering repression, so I can only express my opinion, but not give advice.
Itís a characteristic of
history for oppression to lead to resistance and for resistance often to turn
to violent resistance. If it does, that resistance is invariably called
terrorism. That’s is true for everyone, even the world’s worst mass
murderers. So the Nazis for example described what they were doing in Europe as
defending the population against the terrorism of the partisans. In their eyes,
they were defending the legitimate government of France against the terrorist
partisans who were directed from abroad. The same with Japanese in Manchuria.
They were defending the population from the terrorism of Chinese bandits.
Propaganda, no matter how vulgar, always has to have some element of truth in
it, if it is to be credible at all. And even in the case of the worst mass
murderers like the Nazis or Japanese invaders there was an element of truth to
their claims. In some perverse sense their claims were legitimate, and the same
can be said about the claims made by others: the United States, Turkey and
other countries, who claim to be defending the population against terrorism.
With regard to the concept of
terrorism there are really two notions: one is the notion "terror,"
another is the notion "counter-terror." If you look in, for example,
US Army manuals, they define "terror" and they define
"counter-terror." And the interesting thing about the definitions is
they are virtually identical.
Terrorism turns out to be about the
same as counter-terrorism. The main difference is who is the agent of the
terrorist violence. If it’s someone we don’t like, it is terrorism.
If it's someone we do like, including ourselves, it is counter-terrorism. But
apart from that the definitions of the actions are about the same.
Another important difference between
terrorism and counter-terrorism is that what is called
"counter-terrorism" is usually carried out by states. It’s the
terrorism carried out by states. And states have resources that enable them to
be far more violent and destructive than private terrorists. So the end result
is that the terrorism of states far outweighs that of any other entity in the
world. We constantly read that terrorism is the weapon of the weak. That is
totally false, the exact opposite of truth. Like any other weapon, terrorism is
used much more effectively by the strong, and in particular by more powerful
states which are the leaders in terrorism throughout the world, except that
they call it "counter-terrorism."
Now we hear every day that there is
a "war on terrorism" that has been declared by the most powerful
states. In fact that war is re-declared. It was declared in 1981, twenty years
ago. When Reagan administration came into office, it declared that the focus of
US foreign policy would be state-sponsored international terrorism, the plague
of the modern age; they declared that they would drive the evil out of the
world. The war has been re-declared with the same rhetoric, and mostly by the
same people. Among the leaders of the first "war against terror"
twenty years ago are the ones who are directing the current "war against
terror," with the same rhetoric and very likely with the same
consequences.
The focus of the first war on
terrorism was Central America and the Middle East. And both of those regions
were scenes of massive terrorism in the 1980s, the major part of it, by far,
conducted by the US and its clients and allies, on a scale with few recent
precedents in those regions. There is no time to go through the details, but in
the Middle East for example, the most extreme terrorist act by far was the
Israeli invasion of Lebanon - supported, armed, backed by the United States --
which killed about 20,000 people for political ends. There wasn’t any
pretence. It was openly recognized in Israel to be a war to promote the US-Israeli
policy of assuring effective control over the Israeli-occupied territories. And
thatís only one example of the terrorism in the region that was either
carried out directly or decisively supported by the US, exceeding other cases
by a substantial margin.
In Central America, the Reagan
administration at first attempted to follow the model of John F. Kennedy in
South Vietnam, which would have meant attacking Central America directly, using
chemical warfare and napalm, bombing with B52s, and invading with American
troops. But they had to draw back from that intention, because the population
of the US had become considerably more civilised in the twenty years that
intervened, through activism, protest, and organization. Therefore the Reagan
administration had to withdraw from direct outright aggression as in South
Vietnam, and instead turned to international terrorism.
They created the most extraordinary
international terrorist network that the world had ever seen. When a country
like Libya wants to conduct a terrorist act, they hire an individual like
Carlos the Jackal. When a big powerful state like the US wants to carry out
international terrorism, it hires terrorist states: Taiwan, Israel, Argentina
under the neo-Nazi generals, Britain, Saudi Arabia. Other terrorist states
carry out most of the work, along with local agents. The US supplies the
funding and the training and the overall direction.
The effects were horrendous:
hundreds of thousands of people killed, every imaginable kind of torture,
everything you know about from Southeastern Turkey in the past ten years. And
it finally succeeded in crushing popular resistance. There was also a kind of
"clash of civilizations" involved, to borrow a currently-fashionable
phrase: the US was fighting against the Catholic Church. The Church had made a
grave error: it had adopted "preferential option for the poor," a
commitment to work for the benefit of poor people, the vast majority. That was
unacceptable. The war was to a large extent directed against the Church. The
terrible decade opened with the murder of an archbishop. The decade ended with
the murder of six leading Jesuit intellectuals. In between, many priests, nuns
and layworkers were killed and of course tens of thousands of peasants and
workers, women and children, the usual victims.
The terrorism was so extreme that
it even led to a condemnation of the US by the World Court for international
terrorism, and an order to terminate the crime and pay reparations. There was
also a supporting resolution of the Security Council of the United Nations,
calling on all states to observe international law, directed to the US, as
everyone understood. The World Court decision was simply dismissed with
contempt and the war was immediately escalated. The Security Council resolution
calling all states to observe international law was vetoed.
All of this is gone from history.
It is history, but it is not the history that we hear. Since the same war was
re-declared on September 11 -- by many of the same people, with the same
rhetoric - there have been endless reams of paper devoted to the new "war
on terrorism," but you will have to search very hard to find any reference
to what happened during the first "war on terrorism" that the same
people carried out. That’s gone, and it’s gone for very simple
reasons: Terrorism is restricted to what they do to us. What we do to them,
even it is a thousand times more horrible, doesn’t count and it
disappears. That’s the law of history as long as history is written by
the powerful and transmitted by educated classes who choose to be servants of
power.
Let me turn to the Middle East. The
British of course ran the Middle East for a long time. They were the dominant
power, and they had a framework for controlling the region. At first it was
controlled by direct armed force. But after World War I, Britain was weakened,
and it was no longer in a position to rule the area by direct force. So it
turned to other techniques. The military technique it turned to was the use of
air power to attack civilians. Air power had just become available, so Britain
began bombing civilians with aircraft. Also it turned to poison gas, primarily
under the influence of Winston Churchill, who was a really savage monster.
Churchill, as colonial Secretary, ordered the use of poison gas against what he
called "uncivilised tribes": that’s Kurds and Afghans. He
ordered the use of poison gas against these "uncivilised tribes"
because, he said, it will cause a "lively terror" and will save
British lives. That’s the military side. It’s worth remembering
that poison gas was the ultimate atrocity after World War I.
The details of this we are not
going to learn. The reason is that ten years ago the British government
declared an "open government policy," to make the government more
transparent so the people, citizens could learn more about it. The first act of
the open government policy was to remove from the Public Records office all the
documents having to do with the use of poison gas against the uncivilised
tribes. So that history is gone.
There was also a political side to
the control of region. The British concept was to create what they called a
"Arab façade": that means weak states that would depend on
British for support and would serve as a "constitutional fiction" behind
which the British would exert actual rule.
When the US displaced Brtain it
essentially took over the British model. The region is to be run by an Arab
façade of weak, corrupt states, which rely on outside support for their
survival; they are to administer the region. In the background is the US with
its military muscle when it is needed. And the US has a kind of attack dog,
which is called "England," and sometimes seems as much an independent
country as Ukraine was under Soviet rule. Its main function is to carry out the
services it learned during its centuries of experience - the services described
by the leading British statesman Lloyd George, who wrote in secret that
"We have to reserve the right to bomb the niggers." That’s
important, and that’s the British role when the master need some
assistance, or the pretense that it is acting for the "international
community" - a term that means the US and whatever other country agrees to
go along.
The US did add an innovation. It
added an intermediate level of peripheral states, states that would be
"local cops on the beat" in the words of the Nixon Administration,
who used the American idiom: the "local cops on the beat" are the
police who are working in the streets. In this case, the "local cops"
are subsidiary states. Police headquarters is in Washington. Turkey was the
first one. Turkey is the "local cop on the beat," with the task of
ensuring that the Arab façade is protected from their own population,
the most dangerous enemy. Turkey was one of these, Iran under the Shah was
another. After 1967, when Israel destroyed the centre of Arab nationalism, it
joined the alliance. Pakistan was a member for a long time. The idea is to have
non-Arab states that are militarily powerful, and can protect the Arab façade
from indigenous forces that have strange ideas: for example, the idea that the
wealth and resources of the region should go to them, instead of going to rich
people in the West and their local associates. Such ideas are called
"radical nationalism" and they have to be suppressed: by the
"local cops on the beat," who have the first responsibility, and if
they are not a sufficient threat then the US and the attack dog move in, using
the local cops as bases.
Oil was the primary reason for the
concern over the Middle East. There is now a secondary reason, which is quite
important. Thatís water, which is enormously important, and will be even
more so in the future as water resources are being depleted. Here the role of
Turkey becomes even more essential, because Turkey, and particularly the
southeast region of Turkey, is the major source of water for the region. And
control over water also provides what US planners 50 years ago called
"veto power," just like control over oil. If you can terminate the
flow of water to other countries, that will bring them into line. Thatís
presumably a significant purpose of the dams and other projects: to ensure that
control over water will be in hands of US clients, which will ensure control
over the region and probably a veto power over recalcitrant elements.
The enormous US support for the
massive atrocities of the 1990s in this region, which are some of the worst in
the world in this period, is based on the role of Turkey within the US system
of domination of the region. It’s not out of love of the Turks. It is out
of love for the services that Turkey can perform in the region. If Turkey
succumbs to "radical nationalism" - that is, independence - it will
suffer the same fate. The same is true of US support for Israel and other
client states. If they perform their function they are fine. If they get out of
line it will be different. We see that right next door in Iraq. As long as
Saddam Huseyin was only gassing Kurds and torturing dissidents and massacring
people on a huge scale, he was just fine. Britain and the US continued to
support him. After his worst atrocities they even continued to provide him with
the means of developing weapons of mass destruction, along with aid and
assistance that he badly needed, until he made a mistake: he disobeyed orders. That’s
unacceptable, so he therefore has to go, probably to be replaced by some
similar figure. And the same is true for other client states. They are
acceptable no matter how many atrocities they carry out as long as they
continue to fulfill their functions within the world system: to ensure that the
rich and powerful receive what they deserve, namely the wealth of the region
and its resources and markets, and so on.
Let’s turn briefly to the
last topic: September 11th. What we hear constantly is that after September
11th, everything changed. There is a good rule of thumb: if something is
repeated over and over as obvious, the chances are that it is obviously false.
In this case, after September 11th
very little has changed. Policy, goals, concerns and interests of the great
powers remain as they were. There have been some changes. For one thing, there
is now a window of opportunity for harsh and repressive elements throughout the
world to pursue their policies with increased intensity, exploiting the fear
and concerns of their populations, and expecting support from Washington.
As always repression elicits
resistance, and that’s true in this case too. In the US, contrary to what
the headlines and intellectual commentary tell you, since September 11th the
population has become more open, more questioning, more dissident, more involved
in protests, more concerned with ongoing developments. The same is true
worldwide. Two weeks ago there was an international conference in Brazil, the
World Social Forum, which brought together about 60,000 people from around the
world, from popular movements, farmers, workers, environmentalists, women’s
groups, all kinds of people. They organized many very serious and constructive
forums and discussions devoted to major problems of the world. This is the core
of the worldwide popular opposition that is designing, and seeking to
implement, programs that run counter to the global policies of transferring
even more wealth and power to hands in which wealth and power are already
concentrated.
The same is true right here. In
Turkey, both Turks and Kurds are resisting courageously, working for changes
that will make the society more open, liberal, free and just. They are a model
that Western human right activists admire and should learn from. They are
providing an inspiring example of what can be done under extremely harsh
conditions to overcome repression and state violence to create a more decent
and humane society. Their struggles and their goals are an inspiration for
others to do more. And again, that’s why it is tremendous privilege and
honour personally for me to stay with you for a few days here.
As you know Kurdish language has
been suppressed in Turkey, and is has been kept out of the educational system.
What is the relationship between personal identity and the mother tongue? On
the one side there is widespread use of English as a global language, and on
the other there is a revival of local languages as a counter-trend to
globalisation. In this context, how do you assess the revival of native
languages in Europe and elsewhere?
In Spain under the Franco regime,
the local languages were suppressed. People could not speak Basque or Catalan,
or other languages. And they are separate languages, not Spanish; Basque is not
even related to Spanish. After Fascism was overthrown, there was a revival of these
languages, which of course had never disappeared. People still spoke them in
their homes, with their friends when the secret police was not listening. And
they revived. I will tell you a personal experience: one of my daughters was
living in Spain after the fall of Franco regime. She was living in Barcelona,
and when I was in Europe speaking I went to visit her. This was two years after
the fall of Franco, and there wasn’t a sign of Catalan. Everything on the
streets was Spanish, the signs were Spanish, everyone on the street spoke
Spanish, just travelling there you would not know that the language of the
people was Catalan. I went back five years later and there was no Spanish,
there was only Catalan: the street signs were Catalan, the books were Catalan,
the school system was Catalan, the language just revived. The same thing is
happening in the Basque country and other places. And elsewhere, for example,
inside the UK. So, Welsh for example, was not heard much not very long ago. Now
if you go to Wales and listen to children coming out of the school, they are
talking Welsh. The language has been revived. It is a part of a healthy
movement within Europe away from the nation-state system towards what is
sometimes called a "Europe of the Regions," a federation of regional
areas with their own language, culture, political autonomy within a bigger
federation. And that’s extremely healthy. What the questioner said about
personal identity is quite true. Your personal identity is very closely tied to
your native language. If this is a language which is not permitted to be freely
used for communication, for talk, for expression, for literature, for song, for
any purpose, that’s an infringement on your fundamental human rights. And
it diminishes you as a person. Therefore it has to be preserved and recovered,
and this can be done, as is happening in many places. The question of what will
happen to local languages is a largely a matter of choice, not a matter of
historical forces that are out of control. There was no way of predicting that
Welsh would again become the language of the people of Wales, their literature
and so on.
There was no way of predicting
that. It happened because they chose to achieve that result. Regionalization is
taking place in Europe in reaction to the centralization of the EU. And I
suspect that reaction to the centralization of what’s called
"globalisation" will also include a revival of local languages,
cultures, interest groups of all kinds, for example feminist groups that don’t
have any geographical boundary. But that has to be achieved. Nothing is going
to happen by itself. It has to be achieved like all other human rights by
dedication, commitment and struggle. Otherwise it won’t happen.
As for English becoming an
international language, that’s a separate matter. Its a matter of who has
been dominant. English is a world language because England and the US conquered
the world. As the world becomes more diversified, and I suspect it will, there
will be other languages of international communication. That’s quite
apart from the question of the revival and the vitality of the regional and
local cultures, languages, and literatures, and so on. These developments can
quite go on quite in parallel.
How do you define the notion of
"freedom"?
I would not even try. Its a
fundamental basic concept that we understand but we cant define. We understand
such concepts, but cant hope to define them in words. We define them by our
actions and by our commitment. Freedom is what we make of it. If we stand
against repression, authority and illegitimate structures, we are expanding the
domain of freedom, and that’s what freedom will be. That’s what we
create; there is nothing to define in words.
In the "new world order"
of US hegemony, under what kind of treats is the notion of "culture"?
Its a matter of will and choice.
History doesn’t have natural laws the way physics does. It depends on
what people decide and choose. That’s why nobody can ever predict
anything. If you look at the record of prediction in human affairs, you find
they cant predict anything. The main reason is that too much depends on will,
choice, determination and commitment. So what will happen to cultural freedom
under new global conditions depends on what people like you decide to do. If
you create and maintain vital and vigorous independent cultures, they’ll
exist. If you decide not to, if you want to just listen to Brazilian soap
operas and drink soft drinks, they will disappear. But there is a choice.
You are a US citizen who know to
say "NO!". We read from your biographies that you have been an
anti-systemic dissident since you are ten years old. What is the secret in
this?
The secret is very simple. For
hundreds of years in the US, as elsewhere, people have been struggling hard to
enlarge the domain of freedom and justice and there have been successes. And
the result is that people like me are lucky. We can enjoy the privilege of
enjoying the freedom that has been won. These are not gifts, they are not in
the Constitution, they are not in the Bill of Rights. James Madison, one of the
main founders of the US system said that a "parchment barrier" will
not defend against repression. Take any nice words you like, you have to give
them their meaning, and the meaning is given by struggle and commitment. And it
has been done over the centuries to a very significant extent. The result is
that people in the US have freedom to a larger extent. The secret is to have a
history behind you of people who dedicated themselves to creating a relatively
free society. That’s the secret.
What do you think, is the role of
US in Kurdish Problem in general and in the handing over of Kurdish leader to
Turkey by an international conspiracy, in particular?
The US has a role in just about
anything that happens in the world. It is the most powerful state in the world.
It is concerned with developments here and it is undoubtfully involved in
Kurdish affairs. Not just here, the same in Iraq. For example, the US supported
a Kurdish uprising in Iraq, back in the early 70ís, until a certain
point came when an Iranian-Iraqi deal was made and the US decided to sell the
Kurds out, and they were slaughtered. After that Henry Kissenger, who was in
charge, was criticised in Congress for having first supported the Kurdish
struggle and then abandoning them when they were no longer useful, resulting in
slaughter. He made a famous comment, which was something like this:
"Foreign policy should not be confused with missionary work." The
same has been true here, in a particularly shameful way in very recent years.
As you know the Kurdish opposition
turned to peaceful means of struggle. What do you think about this new policy?
You know better than I do. This is
not the first time. In 1993, a ceasefire was declared by the Kurdish
opposition. The EU tried to pressure Turkey to respond constructively to it.
Instead, the Turkish government, with crucial US support, escalated the war.
That led to years of further atrocities and destruction. There is now another
move towards a peaceful political settlement. Its the right move in my opinion.
The question arises what will be the reaction of the Turkish government, and
this heavily depends on the US. Will there be constructive reactions? We have
to try to make that be the case. As people in US, we have to try in our own
way. It can develop further. Its the right direction, and I think it will lead
to a fruitful outcome.
As you know, there is a
"Meeting of Civilizations" in Istanbul, where Kurdish civilization
has not been represented. This meeting is supposed to be an antithesis to the
"Clash of Civilisations". What is your opinion about the thesis of
"clash of civilizations?"
The fact that the Kurdish
civilisation was not represented is for the same reason as the fact that
Palestinian civilisation was not represented, or any other repressed group.
These are meetings of powerful states and other powerful forces in the world.
They don’t represent anyone but themselves, and furthermore they don’t
represent civilisations. The lives of the Saudi Arabian elite probably center
in London, and that is where they belong. It’s probably where they will
flee if there is an internal uprising they cant control. They have little
relation to the people of Saudi Arabia, just as the ruling elites of other
countries have little relation to their own population. The US government, for
example, certainly does not represent the US population. The population in US
strongly opposes some of the most important and basic policies pursued by the
government, which therefore have to be pursued in secret. The talk about
civilizations is mostly propaganda.
As for Islam being considered the
enemy, that is surely not true. In the 1980ís the major foreign policy
issue in US that dominated all discussion was the wars in Central America, and
these were wars fought against Catholic Church, not Islam. The Catholic Church
in Latin America, after centuries of serving the rich, had moved towards an
effort to serve the poor, and at once it became an enemy. Many terrorist
atrocities were directed against the Church. Was there a Clash of
Civilizations? No. At the same time, US was strongly supporting the most
reactionary Islamic state in the world, namely Saudi Arabia, which has been a
US client since its origins.
The US was also organizing the most
extreme radical Islamists it could find in the world, because they were best
killers, and was using them as weapons against Russia. Indonesia, the biggest
Islamic state, was a wonderful friend ever since president Suharto took over in
1965 and carried out a huge mass slaughter killing maybe a million people,
mostly peasants. He immediately became a great friend, and remained so while he
committed some of the worst crimes of the modern era. In 1995, the Clinton
administration described Suharto as our kind of guy True enough. The world does
not break down into clashes of civilisations, it breaks down into power
interests that cross languages and cultures, and mostly are fighting against
their own populations. The notion of "clash of civilisations" became
popular after the end of the Cold War when some new propaganda framework was
needed in order to mobilize people. It does not mean anything beyond that.
What is the probability of a US
attack on Iraq? How will this effect Turkey and the Kurds?
This is an important issue that is
in the agenda nowadays. There are two kinds of reasons for a possible US attack
on Iraq. The first is domestic, internal to the US. If you were an advisor to
the Bush administration, what would you say? Would you say, "try to focus people’s
attention on the Enron Scandal, and the fact that the proposed tax cuts for the
rich will undermine all social programs and will leave most of the population
in serious trouble? Is that what you want the people to pay attention to,
policies like these? Obviously not. What you want is for people to be
frightened, to huddle under the umbrella of power, not to pay attention to what
you are doing to them while serving the interests of narrow rich and powerful
sectors. So you want to have a military conflict. That’s the domestic
side.
In the international side, Iraq has
the second largest reserves of oil in the world. The first is Saudi Arabia,
Iraq is the second. US certainly will not give up control of this huge source
of power and wealth. Furthermore, right now, if the Iraqi oil were to come back
into the international system, it would be largely under the control of Russia,
France and others, not US energy companies. And the US is not going to permit
that. So we can be pretty confident that one way or another the US is trying to
ensure that Iraq will re-enter to the international system under US control.
Now, how do you achieve this? Well, one plan, and this plan has been discussed
in Turkey as you know, is for the US to use Turkey as a mercenary military
force to conquer Northern Iraq with ground troops while the US bombs from
20,000 feet, The compensation for Turkey could be that it will get control of
the oil resources of Musul and Kerkuk, which it has always regarded as part of
Turkey. And for the US, that will block its enemies -- Russia, France and
others -- from having privileged access to the oil of that region. Meanwhile the
US will take over the South in some fashion.
What happens to the Kurds?
I hate to think about it. It will
probably be a terrible slaughter of one kind or another. They will be right in
the middle of this. For Turkey, apart from the question of right and wrong, it
would be a very dangerous move. And it’s a very dangerous move for the US
as well, if only because it could blow up the whole region. It could lead to a
revolution in Saudi Arabia. Nobody knows.
Elements of the Bush administration
are pursuing these and similar plans, and you can see the logic. Whether they
will be allowed to implement such plans is another story. I’m rather
sceptical. I think the arguments against it are probably too strong. But they don’t
know themselves, and surely no one else can.